Showing posts with label Kentucky. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kentucky. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 9, 2013

Despite Unconstitutionality, Kentucky Enacts Consumer Use Tax Notification Requirement for Out-Of-State Retailers

On April 4, 2013, Kentucky Governor Steve Beshear signed into law HB 440. The bill includes an amendment to Kentucky’s tax code which will impose a new requirement on every retailer that makes sales into Kentucky from outside the state and that is not required to collect Kentucky use tax. The law requires that these retailers provide a notice to their customers that Kentucky purchasers are required to report and pay use tax directly to the Kentucky Department of Revenue. A similar provision enacted in Colorado in 2010 as part of a broader notification and reporting bill was declared unconstitutional by a federal judge in Direct Marketing Association v. Huber, a case now on Appeal before the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. Brann & Isaacson is counsel to the DMA in the Colorado litigation.

While three other states—Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Vermont—have similar consumer use tax notification requirements on the books, Kentucky’s new law is more aggressive:

First, on its face, Kentucky’s law requires retailers to use “the exact required use tax notification language” set forth in the statute concerning compliance with Kentucky law, and does not include a substantial compliance provision likes other states. According to the statute, even if a seller already has a notice provision for other states, that notice provision is only adequate for purposes of Kentucky law “if the consolidated notification meets the requirements of this section.” In other words, only the “exact” language of the Kentucky law, and not something substantially similar that a retailer adopts in response to another state’s notification law, appears to be allowed.

Friday, March 9, 2012

More Cautionary Tales of State Tax Laws With Retroactive Effects

We have written before about retroactive tax laws, but there is reason for concern that the phenomenon of states resorting to retroactivity may be on the rise. In the most recent case to wind its way to the end of the state appeal process, the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld a statute that amended Michigan’s use tax code with an effective date 5 years prior to its enactment. General Motors Corp. v. Department of Treasury, 290 Mich. App. 355 (2010), appeal denied, 489 Mich. 991 (2011), and cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1143 (2012). The Michigan Supreme Court denied review in the case last year, and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the decision a few weeks ago, in late January 2012. The decision by the GM Court, which cited the Kentucky case discussed in our earlier blog post, Miller v. Johnson Controls, 296 S.W.3d 392 (Ky. 2009), rehearing denied (2009), and cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3324 (2010), suggests that the legal standard a state must satisfy to amend its tax law retroactively is, in many instances, not very exacting.

GM concerned a statute passed by the Michigan legislature to block the giant automaker (and potentially other companies) from obtaining a refund of use tax paid on “demonstration” vehicles driven temporarily by GM employees, but expressly held by GM in inventory for resale, and later sold to consumers. Over the years, GM had paid tens of millions of dollars in use tax based on the Michigan Department of Treasury’s enforcement position, asserted in audits of the company, that GM was required to self-assess and pay Michigan use tax as a result of its employees’ temporary use of the vehicles in the state.

However, in 2006, the Michigan Court of Appeals held (in a case involving auto dealerships) that such demonstration vehicles acquired and held for resale were not subject to use tax, and that interim employee use did not result in conversion of the autos’ use to a taxable use, as the Department argued. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the relevant portion of the Betten decision in 2007. Betten Auto Center, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 272 Mich.App. 14, 20-22 (2006), aff’d in pertinent part, 478 Mich. 874 (2007).

Monday, January 31, 2011

A Reminder About The State Tax Implications of Passive Partnership Interests: U.S. Supreme Court Declines To Review State Court Ruling That Mere Partnership Interest Creates Income Tax Nexus

E-commerce companies that have affiliates doing business as (or even just investment interests in) partnerships or other pass-through entities in states in which the e-commerce company has no direct presence should be aware that such partnership interests may be deemed to create income tax nexus for the company.  A number of state laws and regulations provide that ownership in a pass-through entity establishes nexus for the owner.  See, e.g., 34 TAC Sec. 3.586(c)(13) [Texas]; 830 CMR 63.39.1(8) [Massachusetts]. To date, state tax tribunals have agreed. See, e.g., Shell Gas Gathering Corp. #2, N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, DTA Nos. 821569 and 921570 (Sept. 23, 2010).

Thursday, May 27, 2010

Supreme Court Declines To Review Retroactive Ban On Refund Claims

So you think a state cannot change its tax laws after the fact to validate an erroneous legal interpretation by its revenue department that caused massive over-reporting of tax? Think again. Indeed, we were reminded earlier this week that, at least in some circumstances, states can retroactively adjust the rules to foreclose even pending claims for tax relief.

The United States Supreme Court on May 24 declined to review a decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Miller v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 296 S.W.3d 392 (Ky. 2009). In Miller, the Kentucky Court upheld a state statute enacted in 2000 that retroactively barred refund claims by a group of corporate taxpayers who complied with a policy adopted by the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, challenged the policy as unlawful, and got it invalidated back in 1994 (by the Kentucky Supreme Court, no less).

Here’s the background: In 1988, the Revenue Cabinet interpreted Kentucky law as prohibiting the filing of unitary income tax returns by corporate taxpayers, and instead required each corporation to file a separate return. The inability to file unitary returns resulted in substantially higher Kentucky taxes for a number of corporations. After the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled in 1994 that unitary returns were allowed under Kentucky law, the taxpayers amended their earlier returns, and sought refunds for the excess tax paid during the earlier years.